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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Attorneys quickly learn the trials and tribulations of counseling employers 
on managing their employees. Among other things, employers often seek 
advice on employee hiring, discipline, and performance accountability. In 
providing such advice, attorneys must consider a variety of discrimination 
and retaliation laws, wage and hour statutes, and other legislation that 
regulates the workforce. Assisting public sector employers on managing 
their workforce raises additional, and often more complicated, 
considerations involving the U.S. Constitution. Constitutional 
complications are perhaps most apparent when public employers attempt 
to manage their employees’ off-duty speech.  
The need for employers to regulate their employees’ off-duty conduct is 
critical, if not always obvious. What employees do outside of work can have 
a significant impact on the employer’s business, even when the employer’s 
business is providing public services. Public employers are just as 
susceptible to negative press as any private sector corporation. Citizens 
often expect their public servants to be above reproach. Thus, it remains a 
significant interest of all public employers to regulate their employees to 
maintain their irreproachable status. “Government employers, like private 
employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words 
and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient 
provision of public services.”[1] Nevertheless, the First Amendment often 
serves as a significant legal stumbling block for public employers who 
attempt to modify their employees’ behavior.  
Unlike the private sector, regulating public employee speech may violate 
the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that public 
employees do not surrender their Free Speech rights the moment they 
accept public employment.[2] “[T]he First Amendment protects a public 
employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing 
matters of public concern.”[3] At the same time, those rights are not 
unfettered or consequence free.  When a citizen enters public service, that 
citizen “by necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her 
freedom.”[4] 
Public employers arguably had a much easier time regulating their 
employees’ speech several decades ago. Employees’ access to mass news 
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outlets was extremely limited. By contrast, technological advancements and 
the explosion of social media in the public sphere now provide employees a 
nearly unfettered ability to publicize their opinions on any number of topics 
ranging from the mundane to the inflammatory. 
Social media permeates and influences the lives of most Americans – and 
the public sector workforce is no exception. Social media usage even 
percolates to the highest rung of the governmental ladder. At the federal 
level, President Donald Trump is notorious for using Twitter to convey 
information to his 55.1 million followers, including what pundits may 
describe as incendiary political and social opinions.  According to the Pew 
Research Center, approximately 79 percent of Internet users (or 68 percent 
of all U.S. adults) use Facebook.[5] The ease with which individuals can 
access the world and each other through social media has led to sharing, 
oversharing, commentary on hot-button political and social issues, and 
workplace grievances. 
It therefore should come as no surprise that the accessibility of social 
media, coupled with public employers’ desire to appear above reproach to 
those they serve, has led to an increase in disciplinary matters involving 
public employees who post commentary (either publicly or privately, to a 
few hundred of their closest friends and followers) about high-profile 
controversies, or content that incites strong, perhaps inflammatory, 
political opinions. The following is a small sample of recent employee 
discipline examples based on employee speech on social media:  
 Des Moines, Iowa: the Iowa Department of Public Safety 
terminated a laboratory criminalist after the employee 
posted public comments on Facebook stating, among 
other things, “If you are supporting ‘Black Lives Matters’ 
– You are supporting, even applauding a cop-killer.”[6]    
 Tupelo, Mississippi: the Tupelo Police Department 
terminated a police officer after making a comment on 
Facebook about the use of body cameras, indicating that 
police administrators have forgotten about life on patrol, 
identifying City officials as “Monday Morning 
Quarterbacks,” and stating that “[s]ometimes you have to 




use profanity and threaten a persons well being [sic] to 
get their attention; sometimes you have to kill them.”[7] 
 Belding, Michigan: the Belding Fire Department 
terminated a firefighter who posted a remark on Facebook 
in response to another Facebook user’s comment about 
Collin Kaepernick kneeling during the national anthem 
and the Black Lives Matter movement.[8] 
 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: the Jefferson University 
Hospital terminated an employee after the employee took 
to Facebook to post an incendiary comment about a Black 
Lives Matter protest while also praising police officers.[9] 
 Chicago, Illinois: two police officers were disciplined after 
a community activist posed a photo to Instagram of two 
on-duty police officers kneeling in apparent support of 
Colin Kaepernick and against the idea of police brutality 
and racism, in violation of a rule that prohibited 
uniformed officers from “participating in any partisan 
political campaign or activity.”[10] 
 Nashville, Tennessee: the Metropolitan Nashville Police 
Department terminated a 911 operator after she posted on 
Facebook following the 2016 presidential election, 
proclaiming her support for President Trump. The former 
employee has filed a lawsuit against the City for violating 
her First Amendment Rights.[11] 
Even social media powerhouses like Facebook and Twitter have taken to 
restricting access for those users who have violated terms of service by 
posting content that they deems offensive.[12] 
Typically, an attorney’s first bit of advice to an employer who wishes to 
regulate its employees’ speech is to create and implement effective policies 
detailing what is and is not acceptable conduct. Particularly with public 
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sector employees (a large percentage of whom are subject to statutory or 
collectively bargained “just cause” standards), it is important to place 
employees on notice of employer expectations. Thus, the recent explosion 
of social media usage has led many public employers to promulgate policies 
that limit or regulate speech in an attempt to prevent their employees from 
engaging in the types of potentially detrimental speech noted above.  
Determining how to manage the workplace without impermissibly 
restricting employees’ First Amendment rights can be a daunting task for 
most employers. This is best exemplified by several recent cases where 
public employer policies have been deemed unconstitutionally overbroad 
with respect to the conduct they regulate.  Part of the difficulty arises from 
rather vague legal standards that courts have developed based on imprecise 
guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court. This begs the question– how can a 
public employer put its employees on notice of what is and is not 
appropriate if the employer itself cannot discern clear demarcations 
between what is and is not an impermissible prior-restraint on speech?  
This article suggests a more “user friendly” legal standard for determining 
the constitutionality of employer speech policies.   
Before discussing more “user friendly” legal standards, it is important to 
understand the development of federal case law regarding restrictions on 
public employee speech. Only then can we truly understand the difficulties 
in drafting compliant employer policies, as well as discern how the law 
needs to develop going forward to properly adapt to our new social media 
world. 
Part two of this article will address the legal framework surrounding public 
employee speech. Part three will discuss cases addressing a public 
employer’s ability to limit a public employee’s speech depending upon the 
employee’s role in a governmental agency. Part four will discuss case law 
addressing employer policies restricting speech. Part five will address the 
practical difficulties of applying the law in its current form to manage the 
workplace follows as well as suggestions for crafting narrowly tailored 
policies consistent with case law. 
  




II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR ESTABLISHING PROTECTIONS 
FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH  
A. Pickering  
In Pickering v. Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court set forth a 
two-part test to determine whether a public employee’s speech is protected: 
(1) did the employee speak as a citizen on a matter of public interest; if so 
(2) did the public employer have adequate justification to treat the public 
employee differently than a member of the general public.[13]  
The Court acknowledged that even as public employees, individuals retain 
their rights to comment on matters of public interest.  The Supreme Court 
also acknowledged that public employers have a governmental interest to 
regulate their employees’ speech. Thus, when it comes to employee free 
speech issues, a balance must be struck by weighing “interests of the 
[employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and 
the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of 
public services it performs through its employees.”[14] 
Within this framework, the Supreme Court analyzed whether a Chicago 
suburban school district had improperly terminated a high school teacher 
after the teacher wrote a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the Board of 
Education. In the letter, the teacher addressed the Board’s handling of bond 
proposals and the allocation of financial resources, which seemingly 
favored athletics over academics.[15] The Court ultimately concluded that 
the employer’s decision to terminate the employee was improper.[16] In 
applying the so-called “Pickering” test, the Court’s majority found that the 
employee’s criticisms involved subjects of public attention and concern.[17]  
The Court further found that the employer failed to demonstrate that the 
employee’s statements impeded the employee’s job performance or 
otherwise interfered with the school district operations.[18]  In considering 
the public importance of the speech, the Court reasoned, the interest of the 
employer in limiting the employee’s opportunity to contribute to public 
debate was not significantly greater than the interest in limiting a similar 
contribution by any member of the public.[19]  
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B. Connick  
In Connick v. Myers, the U.S. Supreme Court identified a limitation on the 
protection afforded to public employee speech when such speech does not 
impact matters of public concern.[20] The Court stated that when a public 
employee speaks as an employee upon matters of personal interest, “a 
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of 
a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to an 
employee’s behavior.”[21] Whether a public employee’s speech addresses a 
matter of public concern is determined by the content, form, and context of 
a statement, and the record as a whole.[22] 
In Connick, an assistant district attorney faced transfer to a different 
section of criminal court.[23] She strongly opposed the transfer and 
expressed her views to several supervisors.[24] Shortly after, the assistant 
district attorney distributed a questionnaire to other employees seeking 
input on working conditions, the office transfer policy, office morale, 
confidence in supervisors, and, among other things, whether employees felt 
pressure to work in political campaigns.[25] The employer terminated the 
assistant district attorney for refusal to accept the transfer and because it 
deemed circulating the questionnaire an act of insubordination.[26]   
The Court concluded that the termination of the assistant district attorney 
did not violate her constitutionally protected right of free speech. While one 
aspect of the questionnaire touched upon a matter of public concern, 
pressure to work on political campaigns, the Court concluded that the 
remainder of the questionnaire reflected personal gripes and distaste with 
the status quo. “While discipline and morale in the workplace are related to 
an agency's efficient performance of its duties, the focus of [the assistant 
district attorney’s] questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office 
but rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her 
superiors.”[27] The questions in the questionnaire “reflect[ed] on 
employee’s dissatisfaction with a [job] transfer and an attempt to turn that 
displeasure into a cause celèbre.”[28] Because these questions did not 
touch on a matter of public concern, the first Amendment did not apply to 
protect the assistant district attorney’s job.[29] 
Because one aspect of the questionnaire for which the employee was 
discharged touched on a matter of public concern, the Court engaged in the 
Pickering balancing test.[30] The Court recognized that while the 




questionnaire did not impede the assistant district attorney’s ability to 
perform her job responsibilities, the questionnaire was viewed by her 
superiors as a “mini-insurrection.”[31] Thus, when, as here, “close working 
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree 
of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”  Critically, the 
Court stated that it was not necessary for the employer to allow “events to 
unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of 
working relationships is manifest before taking action.”[32] In addition, the 
Court found the context within which the assistant district attorney’s 
speech rose (i.e. on the heels of her transfer notice) relevant: “When 
employee speech concerning office policy arises from an employment 
dispute concerning the very application of that policy to the speaker, 
additional weight must be given to the supervisor’s view that the employee 
has threatened the authority of the employer to run the office.”[33]  
C. Garcetti  
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Garcetti v. Ceballos that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees 
are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the 
Constitution does not insulate their communication from employer 
discipline.”[34]  Thus, if a public employee is disciplined for speech made 
pursuant to his or her job duties, that speech may not be constitutionally 
protected (although, it may enjoy legal protection under a host of other 
federal, state and local employment laws).[35]   
The Court recognized the well-established competing interests between (1) 
the government’s need to restrict speech in its role as the employer to 
ensure the effective functioning of its enterprise, and (2) the First 
Amendment rights of citizens who also happen to be government 
employees.[36] The Court explained public employees must accept 
limitations on their First Amendment rights because “[g]overnment 
employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over 
their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance 
for the efficient provision of public services.”[37] Given the position in 
society public employees occupy, when they “speak out, they can express 
views that contravene governmental policies or impair the proper 
performance of governmental functions.”[38] 
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In Garcetti, a defense attorney contacted a deputy district attorney for the 
Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office about a pending criminal 
matter.  The defense attorney explained that an affidavit used to obtain 
critical search warrants contained inaccuracies and that he would be 
challenging the warrant. The deputy district attorney investigated the 
affidavit and believed it contained significant misrepresentations.  
Thereafter, the deputy district attorney wrote internal memorandums to his 
supervisors, explaining his concerns with a pending criminal matter and 
recommending dismissal of that particular criminal case. Despite the 
deputy district attorney’s recommendation to dismiss the case, it proceeded 
to a suppression hearing. The defense subpoenaed the deputy district 
attorney to testify for the defense regarding his observations about the 
affidavit.  Despite Ceballos’ testimony, the court rejected the challenge to 
the search warrant.[39]   
After the suppression hearing, the deputy district attorney alleged that he 
had been reassigned, denied promotions, transferred to a less desirable 
office and given less desirable cases, all in retaliation for his previously 
expressed concerns.  He filed an internal grievance over the matter, which,  
the employer denied.[40]  Subsequently, the deputy district attorney filed 
suit alleging violations of his First Amendment free speech rights.   
The Court concluded that the deputy district attorney’s speech did not 
touch on a matter of public concern, because his expressions were made 
pursuant to his official duties.[41] Thus,  because he wrote the 
memorandums as part of his job duties and not as a public citizen, the First 
Amendment did not protect the speech.[42]  
D. Lane v. Franks 
In Lane v. Franks, the Supreme Court addressed whether “public 
employees may be fired – or suffer other adverse employment 
consequences –for providing truthful subpoenaed testimony outside the 
course of their ordinary job responsibilities.”[43]  The dispute arose from 
the termination of the Director of a state-funded program at a community 
college.  The Director, Lane, discovered that a State Representative was on 
the payroll but was not reporting for work. He confronted the State 
Representative and reported the issue to his superiors. Lane ultimately 
terminated the State Representative who was subsequently tried and 
convicted of mail fraud and theft. Lane provided subpoenaed testimony 




against the State Representative both before the federal grand jury and in 
the jury trial against her.  Lane’s employment was subsequently terminated, 
and Lane sued under 42 U.S.C § 1983, specifically seeking relief for 
retaliation against Lane for exercising his protected right under the First 
Amendment to speak on matters of public concern.[44] 
The Defendants argued, and the lower court concurred, that because Lane’s 
testimony pertained to information gained from the performance of his 
official duties, it was a part of those duties and was not made in his capacity 
as a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern.[45]  The Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected this argument.[46]  First, the Court held that truthful 
testimony under oath by an employee is speech as a private citizen, even if 
the testimony pertains to that person’s employment or information related 
to employment.[47] Second, the Court determined that Lane’s testimony 
was speech on a matter of public concern—public corruption and misuse of 
state funds.[48] Finally, the Court applied the Pickering balance test and 
found no governmental interest in favor of restricting the speech at issue: 
“There is no evidence, for example, that Lane’s testimony . . . was false or 
erroneous or that Lane unnecessarily disclosed any sensitive, confidential, 
or privileged information while testifying.”[49]  
III. EMPLOYEE’S JOB POSITION/ROLE IN GOVERNMENTAL 
AGENCY MAY DICTATE ABILITY TO DISCIPLINE FOR 
SPEECH  
As discussed above, a public employee’s speech rights are balanced against 
the right of the public employer to control its workforce. Nevertheless, this 
balancing act becomes complicated when one considers the employee’s 
position in the public employer’s hierarchy. It is well-recognized that 
because all public employees occupy trusted positions in society, “[w]hen 
they speak out, they can express views that contravene governmental 
policies or impair the proper performance of governmental function.”[50] 
However, certain employees hold more influential positions within a public 
employer’s hierarchy than others. As a practical matter, the more 
managerial responsibility and discretion a public employee possesses, the 
greater the risk that the employee’s speech may adversely impact the public 
employer’s operations.  Public safety employees, regardless of where they 
are positioned in a public employer’s chain of command, are particularly 
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capable of impacting their employer’s operations with their speech, which 
in turn can easily trigger pubic ire.  
Thus, while the context of an employee's speech is important, so too is the 
employee's managerial role and public visibility within the government 
agency.  This role and visibility naturally must be considered when 
determining whether speech stands to disrupt the operation and mission of 
the agency.[51] For the agency to be effective, taxpayers must be able to 
trust its public safety officers and those in positions of exalted power and 
influence.  
In theory, public employers should be able to promote stricter regulation of 
these higher level managerial employees and public safety personnel 
because, particularly in the public safety context, a governmental employer 
“has a more significant interest than the typical government employer in 
regulating the speech activities of its employees in order to promote 
efficiency, foster loyalty and obedience to superior officers, maintain 
morale, and instill public confidence.”[52] So, while social media has 
increasingly become a popular avenue to express personal beliefs, public 
safety personnel and higher level managerial employees must understand 
that there are very real consequences to their behavior. 
In balancing the public employee's interest in speaking on matters of public 
concern against the government's interest in providing effective and 
efficient government through its employees, the context of the employee's 
speech, including the employee's role in the government agency, and the 
extent to which it disrupts the operation and mission of the agency, must all 
be taken into account.[53] 
A prime example of this multi-factored approach was seen in Rankin v. 
McPherson, where, a probationary clerical employee working in a county 
constable’s office was terminated for stating, after hearing of the attempt on 
the life of President Ronald Reagan, “If they go for him again, I hope they 
get him.”[54] 
The Supreme Court in Rankin looked to Connick v. Meyers for guidance in 
determining the threshold question of whether the clerical employee’s 
speech touched on a matter of public concern. The Rankin Court concluded 
that the county clerk’s statement dealt with a matter of public concern and 
that “[t]he inappropriate or controversial character of a statement is 




irrelevant to the question whether it deals with a matter of public 
concern.”[55] 
Next, the Rankin Court engaged in the Pickering balancing test to 
determine how the clerical employee’s interest in making her statement 
weighed against the governmental employer’s interest in promoting the 
efficiency of its public services.[56]  The Court concluded that the employer 
failed to prove its governmental interest outweighed the former employee’s 
First Amendment rights. There was “no evidence that [the comment] 
interfered with the efficient functioning off the office. The Constable was 
evidently not afraid that [the clerk] had disturbed or interrupted other 
employees – he did not inquire to whom respondent had made the remark 
and testified that he ‘was not concerned who she made it to.’”[57] There 
was also no evidence that the former employee “had discredited the office 
by making her statement in public. [The clerk]’s speech took place in an 
area to which there was ordinarily no public access; her remark was 
evidently made in a private conversation with another employee.”[58] The 
Court went on to state the termination for the content of her speech was 
“unrelated to the functioning of the [constable’s] office, [and] it was not 
based on any assessment by the Constable that the remark demonstrated a 
character trait that made respondent unfit to perform her work.[59] 
The Rankin Court held that the employee’s job and level of authority within 
the governmental organization plays a role in determining “[t]he burden of 
caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak.”[60] The 
Court placed great emphasis on the clerical nature of her job stating: 
Where, as here, an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public 
contact role, the danger to the agency’s successful functioning from that 
employee’s private speech is minimal.  We cannot believe that every employee in 
Constable Rankin’s office, whether computer operator, electrician, or file clerk, is 
equally required, on pain of discharge, to avoid any statement susceptible of 
being interpreted by the Constable as an indication that the employee may be 
unworthy of employment in his law enforcement agency.  At some point, such 
concerns are so removed from the effective functioning of the public employer 
that they cannot prevail over the free speech rights of the public employee.[61] 
Rankin was decided by a 5 to 4 split Court.  Justice Antonin Scalia authored 
the dissenting opinion, noting at least two critical areas of disagreement.  
First, the dissent took issue with the majority’s conclusion that the 
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statement uttered by the clerk dealt with a matter of public concern.  
According to the dissent, “the majority failed to explain how a statement 
expressing approval of a serious and violent crime – assassination of the 
President – can possibly fall within that category.”[62] Justice Scalia 
stated:  
Surely the [majority] does not mean to adopt the reasoning of the court below, 
which was that [the clerk]’s statement was ‘addressed to a matter of public 
concern’ within the meaning of Connick because the public would obviously be 
‘concerned’ about the assassination of the President.  That is obviously untenable: 
The public would be ‘concerned’ about a statement threatening to blow up the 
local federal building or demanding a $1 million extortion payment, yet that kind 
of ‘public concern’ does not entitle such a statement to any First Amendment 
Protection at all.[63] 
The dissent stated that the clerk’s comment crossed the line where she 
“stopped explicitly criticizing the President’s policies and expressed a desire 
that he be assassinated.”[64] Therefore, the discipline for the speech should 
have presumably been upheld. 
Second, the dissent explained that even if it concurred that the statement 
touched on a matter of public concern, the majority’s holding that the 
government’s interest did not outweigh the speaker’s interest was 
misplaced based upon the consideration of the clerk’s role in the law 
enforcement agency.  The dissent stated that the majority’s  
sweeping assertion (and apparent holding) that where an employee ‘serves no 
confidential, policymaking, or public contact role, the danger to the agency’s 
successful functioning from that employee’s private speech is minimal’ is simply 
contrary to reason and experience.  Nonpolicy making employees (the Assistant 
District Attorney in Connick, for example) can hurt working relationships and 
undermine public confidence in an organization every bit as much as 
policymaking employees.[65]   
In other words, the dissent took issue with the proclamation that non-
policy making, non-executive type employees could never presumably 
impact negatively taxpayer confidence in a public employer or relations 
among coworkers.  Given that the clerk worked for a law enforcement 
agency, the dissent stated that “[a]s a law enforcement officer, the 
Constable obviously had a strong interest in preventing statements by any 
of his employees approving, or expressing a desire for, serious violent 
crimes –regardless of whether the statements actually interfere with office 




operations at the time they are made or demonstrate character traits that 
make the speaker unsuitable for law enforcement work.”[66]   
The dissent further compared this matter to Connick, where the Court 
upheld the termination of an assistant district attorney for circulating a 
questionnaire criticizing her supervisors. Assuming the public concern 
element was satisfied here as it was in Connick, the dissent noted that the 
discharge of the clerk should not have violated the Ffirst Amendment either 
because the comment, like the questionnaire, “carrie[d] the clear potential 
for undermining office relations.”[67] This was true because the clerk 
worked in an office devoted to law enforcement and because one of the 
constable’s deputies brought the statement to the constable’s attention.[68]    
In light of Rankin, it seems fair to conclude that speech made by public 
employees who work in “confidential, policy making, or public contact 
role[s]” may be entitled to less protection than speech of non-policy making 
employees who do not have contact with the general public. However, the 
Rankin dissent strongly criticized this position, noting that employees in 
non-policy making positions can just as easily undermine public confidence 
and harm governmental operations.  The Rankin dissent even suggested 
that any employee that works for a law enforcement agency, regardless of 
position within the organization, may lack First Amendment protection 
even though the employee’s comments involve matters of public concern. 
Regardless, subsequent courts have adopted the majority’s approach in 
Rankin by drawing lines between employees with and without policy 
making authority.  Such a distinction often devolves into what appears to be 
artificial “line-drawing.” 
For example, in Pappas v. Giuliani, the Second Circuit explored the impact 
of Rankin with respect to law enforcement employees who had little (if any) 
public visibility or contact.[69] A former police officer (Pappas) alleged that 
he was terminated in violation of the First Amendment after anonymously 
disseminating racist and bigoted materials.[70] At the time of his 
termination, Pappas was working in the Department’s Management 
Information Systems Division, which was a “behind-the-scenes” 
department responsible for maintaining computer systems.[71]  In other 
words, Pappas worked in a non-policy making, non-public contact position.  
The Police Department initiated an investigation into Pappas’ conduct.  
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Pappas eventually admitted to sending the bigoted materials to friends as 
well as to another police department in New York.  However, Pappas stated 
that he circulated the materials in protest because he was “tired of being 
shaken down for money by these so-called charitable organizations.”[72]   
In a 2-1 decision, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s 
determination that the termination did not violate Pappas's rights under 
the First Amendment.[73]  The majority noted that, in her dissent, then-
Judge Sotomayor attached “great importance to the fact that [the 
employee] did not occupy a ‘high level ‘supervisory’ ‘confidential’ or ‘policy-
making’ role” in the Police Department.[74] Judge Sotomayor pointed out 
that Pappas’s specific work assignment involved perfunctory computer 
work as opposed to frequent public interaction, and that his statements 
were made in a manner that did not reveal him to be a police officer.[75]  
However, the majority rejected this distinction. “Given the nature of 
Pappas's statements and their very high capacity to inflict serious harm on 
the employer's mission if it were discovered that they came from a police 
officer, the fact that Pappas acted anonymously, at home, and on his own 
time does not alter the ultimate conclusion that the Department was 
entitled to dismiss him because of the harm to the Department that his 
statements risked to inflict.”[76] In apparent agreement with the Rankin 
dissent, the Second Circuit also noted:  
While it is undoubtedly the case that ill-considered public statements of a high 
policy-making executive often have a higher likelihood of harming the employer’s 
accomplishment of its mission than similar statements made by a file clerk, 
laborer or a janitorial employee, it by no means follows that rank and file 
employees are incapable of harming the employer’s effectiveness by their speech, 
or that governmental employers are powerless to sanction lower level employees 
when their statements do have the capacity to harm the employer’s performance 
of its mission.[77] 
The court further opined that “Rankin certainly did not mean that only 
high level, policy making employees may be removed by reason of their 
speech” and,”[b]y no means does it follow that an ordinary police officer is 
immune from disciplinary discharge for public statements that carry a high 
potential to impair the police department’s performance of its mission.”[78]  
The Fourth Circuit in McVey v. Stacy, applied the Rankin decision to an 
airport manager.[79] The airport manager (McVey), publicly aired the 
tensions between herself and the airport commission.  Specifically, Plaintiff 




received a FOIA request from the local newspaper, requesting reports 
detailing sexist and racist remarks made by commissioners. The 
commission’s chairman allegedly instructed McVey to “buy time” through 
improper tactics, and to not generate any new documents.[80]  When 
McVey refused to certify the FOIA response because of alleged misconduct 
by the commissioners and sent a disclaimer letter to the newspaper that 
stated as much, she was suspended for a month, and thereafter 
terminated.[81]  
The Fourth Circuit remanded the matter to the lower court to determine 
(per Rankin) whether McVey’s job position was equivalent to a 
confidential, policymaking, or public contact role. The court stated that 
“[d]epending on the response to these inquiries, airing publicly the tensions 
between her and the Airport Commission might well be the type of 
disrupting and confidence destroying speech that the Supreme Court in 
Connick held must be subservient to the agency’s interests.”[82]   
In its decision, the Fourth Circuit recognized and listed a number of circuit 
courts of appeals that have denied department heads or other high-ranking 
officials First Amendment protection.[83] These decisions appear to 
reaffirm the principle that executives, directors, and high level managers 
serve at the pleasure of the governmental body and, more importantly, the 
tax payers. Therefore, they must be held to a different and heightened 
standard than lower-level “front line” staff.   
IV. EMPLOYER POLICIES AIMED AT REGULATING SOCIAL 
MEDIA “SPEECH” 
The above-described decisions did not involve social media.  Only recently 
has the U.S. Supreme Court begun to address the relationship between the 
First Amendment generally and the Internet as we currently know it.[84] 
Lower courts have only recently begun to address the practical realities of 
balancing expanded speech opportunities with a public employer’s growing 
concern over the ubiquitous nature of employee commentary on a variety of 
matters involving mundane and significant matters of public concern.  In 
some of these cases,  courts have held that some speech made via social 
media outlets may enjoy protection depending upon the breadth of the 
employer’s promulgated policy.   
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A. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union 
In a decision not involving the Internet, United States v. National Treasury 
Employees Union (“NTEU”), the Supreme Court addressed how courts 
should apply the Pickering balancing test when a generally applicable 
statute or regulation operates as a prior restraint on employee speech as 
opposed to assessing the legality of post-hoc disciplinary action (à la 
Pickering, Connick, or Garcetti).[85]  
NTEU involved a statute prohibiting federal employees from giving 
speeches or writing articles in exchange for compensation, even when the 
topic at issue did not relate to an employee’s job duties.[86] The Court held 
that the statute in question violated the First Amendment.  The Court 
stated that “the Government’s burden is greater with respect to this 
statutory restriction on expression than with respect to isolated disciplinary 
action[s]” in cases like Pickering and its progeny.[87] The Court 
emphasized that such statutes impede a “broad category of expression” and 
“chill[] potential speech before it happens.”[88] Thus, in order to 
promulgate and enforce policies restricting speech, a public employer:  
must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a vast group of 
present and future employees in a broad range of present and future expression 
are outweighed by that expression’s necessary impact on the actual operation of 
government.[89]  
The government must also “demonstrate that the recited harms are real, 
not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these 
harms in a direct and material way.”[90] 
B. Liverman v. City of Petersburg 
In Liverman v. City of Petersburg, two police officers challenged their 
discipline after their employer determined they violated the Police 
Department’s social media policy.[91] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit stated that the court was “sensitive to the Department’s need 
for discipline throughout the chain of command, [but] the policy here and 
the disciplinary actions taken pursuant to it would, if upheld, lead to an 
utter lack of transparency in law enforcement operations that the First 
Amendment cannot countenance.”[92]  
In April 2013, the Police Chief revised the Police Department’s policy 
governing police officers’ use of various social media platforms.[93] The 




policy prohibited the dissemination of any information “that would tend to 
discredit or reflect unfavorably upon the [Department] or any other City of 
Petersburg Department or its employees.”[94] The policy also included the 
following provisions: 
 “Negative comments on the internal operations of the 
Bureau, or specific conduct of supervisors or peers that 
impacts the public’s perception of the department is not 
protected by the First Amendment free speech clause, in 
accordance with established case law.”[95]  
 “Officers may comment on issues of general or public 
concern (as opposed to personal grievances) so long as the 
comments do not disrupt the workforce, interfere with 
important working relationships or efficient work flow, or 
undermine public confidence in the officer.  The instances 
must be judged on a case-by-case basis.”[96]   
 “[The Department] strongly discourages employees from 
posting information regarding off-duty activities” and 
provides that violations will be forwarded to the Chief of 
Police for “appropriate disciplinary action.”[97]   
After the Department promulgated the social media policy, Herbert 
Liverman, an off-duty police officer, posted the following comment on 
Facebook:  
Sitting here reading posts referencing rookie cops becoming instructors.  Give me 
a freaking break, over 15 years of data collected by the FBI in reference to assaults 
on officers and officer deaths shows that on average it takes at least 5 years for an 
officer to acquire the necessary skill set to know the job and perhaps even longer 
to acquire the knowledge to teach other officers.  But in todays (sic) world of 
instant gratification and political correctness we have rookies in specialty units, 
working as field training officer's (sic) and even as instructors.  Becoming a 
master of your trade is essential, not only does your life depend on it but more 
importantly the lives of others.  Leadership is first learning, knowing and then 
doing.[98] 
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Vance Richards, another off-duty officer, responded as follows: 
Well said bro, I agree 110 percent . . . Not to mention you are seeing more and 
more younger Officers being promoted in a Supervisor/ or roll.  It's disgusting 
and makes me sick to my stomach DAILY. LEO Supervisors should be promoted 
by experience . . .  And what comes with experience are “experiences” that “they” 
can pass around to the Rookies and younger less experienced Officers. Perfect 
example, and you know who I'm talking about . . . How can ANYONE look up, or 
give respect to a SGT in Patrol with ONLY 1 1/2yrs experience in the street? Or 
less as a matter of fact. It's a Law Suit (sic) waiting to happen. And you know who 
will be responsible for that Law Suit (sic)? A Police Vet, who knew tried telling 
and warn the admin for promoting the young Rookie who was too inexperienced 
for that roll to begin with. Im with ya bro . . . smh [Shaking My Head].[99] 
Liverman responded to Richards on the same post stating: 
There used to be a time when you had to earn a promotion or a spot in a specialty 
unit . . . but now it seems as though anything goes and beyond officer safety and 
questions of liability, these positions have been “devalued” . . . and 
when something has no value, well it is worthless.[100] 
Richards replied: 
Your (sic) right . . .  The next 4yrs can't get here fast enough . . .  From what I've 
been seeing I don't think I can last though.  You know the old “but true”  
saying  is . . . Your Agency is only as good as it's (sic) Leader(s) . . . It's hard to 
“lead by example” when there isn't one . . . smh.[101] 
 Liverman’s and Richards’ supervisors learned about this social media 
exchange and notified the Police Chief.  The Chief concluded that the 
behavior violated the Department’s social media policy, because the 
postings contained “negative comments.”[102] Each officer received a 
verbal reprimand and six months’ probation, although they were advised 
this discipline would not impact their eligibility for promotion.[103] 
However, several weeks later, the Chief altered the Department’s 
promotional qualifications by excluding all officers on probation from 
participating in the process.[104]  
After the officers challenged their probation, both officers faced several 
complaints and investigations within the Department. Based on the 
findings of the investigation, the Chief decided to terminate Liverman’s 
employment; but Liverman resigned before receiving the notice.[105] 




Liverman and Richards sued seeking relief for various violations of the First 
Amendment, including allegations that the Department’s social media 
policy infringed upon their free speech rights. 
The court opined that while regulations on social media usage seemed to 
present novel issues, the traditional analysis set forth in Connick and 
Pickering nevertheless applied: 
Indeed, the particular attributes of social media fit comfortably within the 
existing balancing inquiry: A social media platform amplifies the distribution of 
the speaker’s message – which favors the employee’s free speech interests – but 
also increases the potential, in some cases exponentially, for departmental 
disruption, thereby favoring the employer’s interest in efficiency.[106]   
The threshold question for the Fourth Circuit was whether the 
Department’s policy limited an officer’s right to speak on matters of public 
concern.[107] To this, the court responded: 
There can be no doubt that it does: the restraint is a virtual blanket prohibition 
on all speech critical of the government employer.  The explicit terms of the 
Negative Comments provision prevent plaintiffs and any other officer from 
making unfavorable comments on the operations and policies of the Department, 
arguably the “paradigmatic” matter of public concern.[108] 
Turning its focus to the balancing of competing interests, the court again 
noted the “astonishing breadth” of the police department’s social media 
policy:  
The policy seeks to prohibit the dissemination of any information on social media 
that would tend to discredit or reflect unfavorably upon the [Department].[109] 
In particular the Negative Comments Provision proscribes [n]egative comments 
on the internal operations of the Bureau” – which could be just about anything or 
on the “specific conduct of supervisors or peers” – which, again, could be just 
about anything . . . . [110]  
As held in NTEU, the interests of “present and future employees” and their 
“potential audiences” in such speech is “significant.”[111] The court 
recognized the “capacity of social media to amplify expressions of 
rancor  and vitriol, with all its potential disruptions of workplace 
relationships. . . ”[112] However, it also observed that social networking 
sites have “emerged as a hub for sharing information and opinions with 
one’s larger community.”[113] Speech that is prohibited by an employment 
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policy “might affect the public interest in any number of ways, including 
whether the Department is enforcing the law in an effective and diligent 
matter, or whether it is doing so in a way that is just and evenhanded to all 
concerned.”[114] Law enforcement policies could become the subject of 
public debate between law enforcement employees and citizens, and these 
public employees may be “in the best position to know what ails the 
agencies for which they work.”[115] Thus, the court found that the social 
media policy “squashes speech on matters of pubic import at the very 
outset” as it prohibits speech that might impact the Department’s ability to 
enforce laws effectively, diligently and in an evenhanded manner.[116] 
Finding that the policy “unmistakably imposes a significant burden on 
expressive activity,” the Fourth Circuit next considered whether the 
Department demonstrated “real, not merely conjectural” harm to its 
enterprise.[117] The Chief’s primary concern in issuing the policy was to 
maintain camaraderie among officers and build trust within the 
community.  The court recognized these as legitimate interests, particularly 
in a police department. However, the Department failed to demonstrate 
“actual disruption to its mission” arising from the patrol officers’ or any 
other officers’ comments on social media.[118] The court noted that 
officers’ use of social media might present divisiveness within the 
department; however, it indicated that the “speculative ills targeted by the 
social media policy [were insufficient to] justify . . . sweeping restrictions on 
freedom of debate on matters of public concern.”[119]  
The court also addressed the employer’s argument that even if one part of 
the policy was overbroad, another part of the policy, dubbed the “Public 
Concern Provision,” significantly narrowed the reach of the social 
networking policy.[120] The Public Concern Provision, the employer 
argued, “permits comments on issues of general or public concern . . . so 
long as the comments do not disrupt the workplace.’”  The court noted that 
such language appeared more aligned with the analysis in Pickering and its 
progeny; however, “milder language in a single provision does not salvage 
the unacceptable overbreadth of the social networking policy taken as a 
whole.”[121]  
C. Moonin v. Tice   
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Moonin v. Tice provides public employers 
with yet another basic rubric for analyzing whether their employment 




policies comply with the First Amendment.[122] In Moonin, the Nevada 
Highway Patrol (“NHP”) ran a canine drug interdiction program (“K9 
program”) which was, by several accounts, under political attack from 
government and private organizations. One of the commanding officers of 
the NHP sent an email to all patrol officers and several other employees, 
stating that they were not to discuss the K9 program with anyone unless 
they received express permission.  In particular, the email provided that “to 
ensure appropriate flow of communication” there would be 
NO direct contact between K9 handlers, or line employees[,] with ANY non-
departmental and non-law enforcement entity or persons for the purpose of 
discussing the Nevada Highway Patrol K9 program or interdiction program . . . or 
direct and indirect logistics therein.[123]  
The commanding officer’s email went on to provide that violation of the 
directive would be considered insubordination and “dealt with 
appropriately.”[124] The NHP argued that the policy did not violate the 
First Amendment.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed.  
Relying on Pickering and its progeny, including NTEU, the court applied a 
three-step approach.  First, the court asked whether the policy only applied 
to the employees’ official duties or extended to the employees’ speech as 
private citizens.  Second, the court asked whether the policy implicated or 
restricted speech that would address a matter of public concern. If the 
policy extended to employees’ speech as private citizens that touched on 
matters addressing public concern, then the Ninth Circuit would proceed to 
determine whether the employer had a sufficient justification for 
implementing the policy.[125] 
At the first step, citing Lane v. Franks, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he 
critical question . . . is whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within 
the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those 
duties.”[126] The NHP argued that troopers were required to report certain 
misconduct internally. But the court found that the email was so broad that 
it could also be reasonably construed to encompass all speech, including 
the troopers’ speech as citizens.[127] The Ninth Circuit noted the lack of 
any limiting language such as “official agency business” or “information 
that would harm pending investigations or expose sources or methods,” 
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which could have provided employees with better clarity as to what types of 
speech were covered by the policy.[128] 
At the second step, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the policy touched 
on matters of public concern.  The Supreme Court has found that matters of 
public concern include issues “relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news 
interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the 
public.”[129] Given these guidelines, the Moonin court found that the K9 
policy restricted speech on matters of public concern.[130]  
Moonin alleged in his complaint that the policy could be interpreted as 
prohibiting speech regarding the “NHP’s misuse of funds, promoting and 
condoning of unconstitutional searches, and sabotage of the K-9 
Program.”[131] The K9 policy also flatly prohibited all unapproved 
discussions of the K9 program.  The Ninth Circuit stated that although 
there were matters that may not fall within the auspices of public concern, 
the lack of any sort of limitation eliminated this argument from the NHP’s 
arsenal.[132]  For example, the NHP could have limited the scope of the 
policy to internal or confidential logistical matters, or personnel disputes.  
But, without language limiting its scope, the court concluded that the K9 
policy encompassed matters of public concern, including the misuse of 
funds or sabotage of the K9 program.[133]  
Moving to the third step, the Ninth Circuit balanced the rights of the 
employee with the interests of the employer.  In other words, the Ninth 
Circuit determined whether the NHP provided a sufficient justification for 
enacting the K9 policy.  In short, it had not. 
In finding that the NHP’s policy failed the balancing test, the court noted 
that “the government’s burden when seeking to justify a broad deterrent on 
speech that affects an entire group of its employees is greater than when it 
is defending an individual disciplinary decision.”[134] The NHP proffered 
several “justifications” for the email, including concerns that private 
interest groups had the ability to shape NHP policies, the protection of 
sensitive law enforcement information, and controlling official 
communications about the K9 program. The court found the NHP’s 
arguments unpersuasive.[135]  




The NHP’s concern over the private interest groups “which the record 
suggests was the primary impetus for [the commanding officer’s] email” 
was not a sufficient justification for the policy.[136]  Although the NHP may 
not like the “hassle” of dealing with outside organizations and the potential 
influence these groups may have over the NHP, the record failed to 
demonstrate that these outside organizations were actually exerting any 
improper influence “other than successful persuasion of policy-making 
officials.”[137]  To use the interest groups as a sufficient justification, the 
NHP needed to provide specific evidence of “direct, improper interference 
in specific investigations.”[138] “[V]ague allegations about the ‘potential for 
disruption in operations, unethical practices, and favored treatment 
towards . . . special interest groups’ are insufficient to legitimize an interest 
in avoiding outside ‘meddling.’”[139]  
As to the other stated justifications, even if they were legitimate, the court 
found they did not “support the sweeping policy” in the commanding 
officer’s email.[140] As noted above, the policy was devoid of any language 
limiting its application to confidential information that was part of an on-
going investigation, or information conveyed within the officer’s official 
capacity.  Given the sheer breadth of the policy and the lack of any real 
anticipated harm the policy was designed to prevent, the NHP’s policy 
unlawfully restricted employees’ free speech in violation of the First 
Amendment.  
D.  Grutzmacher v. Howard County 
In Grutzmacher v. Howard County, a Fire Department Battalion Chief was 
terminated for violating departmental policy after posting commentary on 
his Facebook account.[141] He filed suit, alleging that he was discharged in 
retaliation for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights and that 
the fire department’s social media policy (which he supposedly violated) 
was facially violative of the First Amendment. 
In November 2012, the Fire Department issued a general order setting forth 
the policy for social media usage by departmental personnel. The “Social 
Media Guidelines” prohibited employees from:  
 “posting or publishing any statements, endorsements, or 
other speech, information, images or personnel matters 
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that could reasonably be interpreted to represent or 
undermine the views or positions of the Department, 
Howard County, or officials acting on behalf of the 
Department or County.”  
 “posting or publishing statements, opinions or 
information that might reasonably be interpreted as 
discriminatory, harassing, defamatory, racially or 
ethnically derogatory, or sexually violent when such 
statements, opinions or information, may place the 
Department in disrepute or negatively impact the ability 
of the Department in carrying out its mission.” 
 “post[ing] any information or images involving off-duty 
activities that may impugn the reputation of the 
Department or any member of the Department.”[142] 
In December 2012, the Fire Department also issued a general order 
addressing the “Code of Conduct.” In part, the Code of Conduct provided 
that: 
 Employees were prohibited “intentionally engag[ing] in 
conduct, through actions or words, which are 
disrespectful to, or that otherwise undermines the 
authority of, a supervisor or the chain of command” and 
“publicly criticiz[ing] or ridicul[ing] the Department or 
Howard County government or their policies.”  
 Employees were prohibited “from engaging in ‘[c]onduct 
unbecoming’ to the Department, which it defined as “any 
conduct that reflects poorly on an individual member, the 
Department, or County government, or that is detrimental 
to the public trust in the Department or that impairs the 
operation and efficiency of the Department.”  




 Employees were required to “conduct themselves at all 
times, both on and off duty, in such a manner as to reflect 
favorably on the Department.”[143] 
On January 20, 2013, while on duty, the Battalion Chief posted the 
following comment to his Facebook page: 
My aide had an outstanding idea . . . lets all kill someone with a liberal . . . then 
maybe we can get them outlawed too! Think of the satisfaction of beating a liberal 
to death with another liberal . . . its almost poetic . . .[144] 
A county volunteer paramedic replied to the Battalion Chief’s post as 
follows: 
But . . .  was it an “assault liberal”? Gotta pick a fat one, those are the “high 
capacity” ones. Oh . . . pick a black one, those are more “scary”. Sorry had to 
perfect on a cool idea![145] 
A few minutes later, the Battalion Chief “liked” the volunteer paramedic’s 
comment and replied “Lmfao! Too cool Mark Grutzmacher!”[146]  
 Departmental employees sent a screen shot to the Fire Chief.  After 
conducting an investigation, the Battalion Chief was directed to review his 
Facebook posts and remove anything inconsistent with the Social Media 
policy.  On January 23, 2013, after the Battalion Chief removed the posts, 
he posted the following commentary to Facebook: 
To prevent future butthurt and comply with a directive from my supervisor, a 
recent post (meant entirly in jest) has been deleted. So has the complaining party. 
If I offend you, feel free to delete me. Or converse with me. I'm not scared or 
ashamed of my opinions or political leaning, or religion. I'm happy to discuss any 
of them with you. If you're not man enough to do so, let me know, so I can delete 
you. That is all. Semper Fi! Carry On.[147] 
A Facebook friend of the Battalion Chief’s replied to the above comment 
and said “As long as it isn’t about the [Department], shouldn’t you be able 
to express your opinions?”  To which Plaintiff responded the same day: 
Unfortunately, not in the current political climate. Howard County, 
Maryland, and the Federal Government are all Liberal Democrat held at 
this point in time. Free speech only applies to the liberals, and then only if 
it is in line with the liberal socialist agenda. County Government recently 
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published a Social media policy, which the Department then published it's 
own. It is suitably vague enough that any post is likely to result in 
disciplinary action, up to and including termination of employment, to 
include this one. All it took was one liberal to complain ... sad day. To lose 
the First Amendment rights I fought to ensure, unlike the WIDE majority 
of the Government I serve.[148] 
 
In February 2013, a member of the Department-affiliated volunteer 
company posted a photo to his Facebook page of “an elderly woman with 
her middle finger raised. Overlaid across the picture was the following 
caption: “THIS PAGE, YEAH THE ONE YOU'RE LOOKING AT IT'S 
MINE[.] I'LL POST WHATEVER THE FUCK I WANT[.]”[149] Above the 
photo, the individual wrote “for you Chief.”  The Battalion Chief “liked” the 
photo.[150]  
The Battalion Chief was ultimately terminated for (1) January 20 and 
January 23 Facebook posts; (2) “like” of and reply to Grutzmacher's 
January 20 comment; (3) replies to comments on Plaintiff's January 23 
post; and (4) “like” of Donnelly's February 17 post.[151]  The conduct was 
deemed to have violated the Department’s Code of Conduct and Social 
Media Guidelines.  
The court first addressed whether Plaintiff’s speech addressed matters of 
public concern.  The court deemed some of the conduct to address matters 
of public concern while other conduct did not. For example, the discussion 
about “liberal[s]” and “assault liberal[s]” implicated matters of public 
concern as it addressed the gun control debate. Similarly, the post 
describing the department’s social media guidelines infringing on free 
speech rights also addressed a matter of public concern.[152] However, 
Plaintiff’s “like” of the elderly woman raising the middle finger and titled 
“for you Chief” amounted to a personal gripe not protected by the First 
Amendment.[153] While some speech was protected speech and other 
speech was not, the court proceeded to the Pickering balancing test and left 
unresolved the question of whether the series of related posts and “likes” 
over several weeks constituted a “single expression of speech” and therefore 
appropriate to consider it in its entirety, despite encompassing both 
matters of public and purely personal concerns.[154]  
The Court concluded that the Department’s interest in efficiency and 
preventing disruption outweighed the plaintiff’s interest in speaking about 
gun control and the Department’s social media policy. The court also 




accorded “substantial weight to [the] fire department’s interest in limiting 
dissension and discord within the ranks.”[155] In addition, the Court placed 
emphasis on the fact that the Battalion Chief’s speech “significantly 
conflicted” with his responsibilities as a supervisor.  “As a leader within the 
Department, Plaintiff was responsible for acting as an impartial decision 
maker and ‘enforcing Departmental policies and taking appropriate action 
for violation of those policies.”[156] Here, he was positioned on the lower 
end of the chain-of-command, but was responsible for directly supervising 
first responders. The court cautioned that the balancing test is a 
“particularized” inquiry and that “a fire department’s interest in 
maintaining efficiency will not always outweigh the interests of an 
employee in speaking on matters of public concern.”[157] 
The Fourth Circuit in Grutzmacher did not reach “prior restraint” issues 
posed by  the employer’s social media policy as it had in Liverman. 
Liverman also differs from Grutzmacher, in that  Liverman involved non-
supervisory police officers as opposed to a first-line management 
representative. The Fourth Circuit in Grutzmacher indicated the case 
turned on the content of the speech made by the battalion chief as opposed 
to his organizational rank.  It differed from the speech in Liverman because 
there the police officers raised concerns that more directly impacted the 
public, i.e. training and officer supervision. In Grutzmacher, the social 
media activity had more to do with the national gun control debate as well 
as the battalion chief’s displeasure with the fire chief and the decision to 
have him remove the posts. This difference seemingly creates, at least in the 
Fourth Circuit, yet another subtle layer for employers to consider. That is, 
even if a matter is of significant public concern, the level of protection 
afforded those public concerns will differ depending on whether the subject 
directly involves an employer’s operations (i.e. training and supervision of 
law enforcement officials), as opposed to speech involving a more 
generalized societal debate (e.g., gun control).  Also, without analyzing the 
case within the Rankin parameters, the Fourth Circuit in Grutzmacher may 
have inadvertently recognized a greater need to hold a public safety 
supervisor accountable for his actions versus the front line law enforcement 
officers before it in Liverman.   
However, it is unkown whether, had the fire department in Grutzmacher 
not modified its social media policy to curtail its application, the Fourth 
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Circuit would have struck the policy and, therefore, remanded the decision 
to deal with the disciplinary issue. Or, perhaps the court would have 
compelled the employer to reinstate the battalion chief because he was 
disciplined for violating an unconstitutional policy.  
V. Regulating Public Employee Speech Through Policies, 
Rules, and Regulations – Suggestions for the Future  
It is well settled that a public employer has a legitimate interest and need to 
control and manage its workforce that, by definition, entails placing certain 
restrictions on employees, including their off-duty speech and conduct on 
social media.  However, as evidenced by Moonin and Liverman, employers 
run the risk of curtailing free speech rights if their policies are too broad or 
too vague. Such risk could result in significant litigation costs and damages. 
While it is not yet clear, it is possible that a public employee who is 
terminated in violation of an unconstitutionally broad policy may be 
reinstated. To mitigate against such risks and to protect the ability to 
regulate the workplace, public employers must avoid crafting overly broad 
policies that implicate matters of public concern under the First 
Amendment. For example, in Moonin, the court identified the lack of 
specificity in the K9 policy that limited the scope of the policy to work-
related communications.  In Liverman, the court indicated that while a part 
of the social media policy permitted comments on issues of public concern 
so long as it did not disrupt the workplace, the policy as a whole was 
overbroad and therefore unacceptable.  In addition, the employer aimed the 
overbroad policy at correcting speculative ills, which are insufficient to 
justify “sweeping restrictions” on an employee’s freedom to debate matters 
of public concern.  
Thus, employers should conduct a review of their policies while considering 
the following questions: how specific or vague are the policies; are policies 
limited in scope to only “official duties”; are prohibitions on certain speech 
limited to “confidential” matters; why is the speech being limited, or what is 
the policy intended to correct?  Perhaps limiting language or defining the 
scope of prohibitions would give employees a better idea of the intention 
behind the restriction.  Relatedly, employers may be best served to consider 
an employee’s expectation of privacy when crafting policies aimed at 
curtailing speech. Another method of attempting to narrowly tailor 
restrictions on speech is to apply different expectations to managerial and 
executive level employees (on the one hand) and rank-and-file non-public 




safety employees (on the other hand). Such a strategy may serve to protect 
employers from constitutional challenges. However, this may create 
difficulty in administration that would hinge on the sophistication of the 
human resources professionals to administer multiple related policies. 
Policies should also consider exceptions for the lengths an employee takes 
to privatize or publicize the speech on social media. For example, a non-
supervisory non-law enforcement office staff person who limits access to 
her social media account to some of her closest friends may be entitled to 
more leniency for her speech. Whereas, the same non-supervisory law 
enforcement officer who posts and comments on a “hot button topic” via a 
public setting for her social media account should be subject to stricter 
scrutiny under an employment policy. 
Moonin and Liverman highlight yet another issue that employers should 
consider, particularly those employers with policies falling toward the 
broad end of the spectrum. As noted above, First Amendment discipline 
cases (Pickering) and prior restraint cases (Moonin and Liverman) 
generally use the same analytical framework; however, there are some 
notable differences. Chief among the distinctions is the public employer’s 
burden for justifying its actions. Public employers seem to have a greater 
burden defending themselves in restraint cases as compared to discipline 
cases.  Moreover, an employer cannot defend its policy by arguing that it is 
meant to prevent “anticipated harms” when the harms do not actually exist 
(as opposed to some decisions like Pappas v. Giuliani, where even 
anticipated harm was sufficient to justify an employee termination).  
Employers will also have a difficult time defending their policies if the 
policies will not “in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.”  
 
How to apply the Pickering balancing test and “real” versus “anticipated” 
harms in a written policy is anything but a small feat. It is seemingly 
altogether unworkable, at least until the courts better define actual harms 
that exist at the hands of employee speech on social media.  In that respect, 
courts should consider harmonizing case law involving discipline and 
overbreadth cases in the following manner: Discard the apparent 
distinction between an employer’s burden in justifying the need for 
discipline based on actually “uttered” speech versus the burden in justifying 
the breadth of a speech policy in the first instance.  Courts appear more 
willing to defer to a public employer’s judgment when it comes to assessing 
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the nature of actually spoken speech as opposed to policies intended to 
define limits on that same speech in the first instance (not unlike Justice 
Stewart’s old adage about knowing “obscenity” when he sees it). However, 
such a distinction may create the potential for absurd results, where a 
policy may be found invalid ab initio due to its overbreadth, yet an 
employee’s discipline found legitimate due to the unprotected nature of the 
“uttered” speech. Short of abandoning the Pickering balancing test 
altogether, courts could avoid such an “I will know it when I see it” 
approach by more readily embracing the principle first articulated in 
Pickering that public employees must understand that their free speech 
rights as citizens are necessarily curtailed (but not entirely abandoned) 
once they accept public employment. By embracing this more common 
sense approach, courts could analyze employer policies in a way that is 
more similar to the discipline context by assuming that public employees 
will not be chilled in their First Amendment expression simply because 
“inartful words” may have been used by a public employer in a good faith 
attempt to clarify the boundaries of acceptable employee speech. More 
explicitly acknowledge the reality that even non-policy making employees 
can embroil their public employers in public relations nightmares with 
their publicized speech, such that even non-policy making employees can 
sometimes lose the protections of the First Amendment by commenting on 
matters of public concern. Consider adding an explicit “distribution” or 
“extent of publication” element to the Pickering balancing test, which takes 
into account the lengths to which an employee publicizes his or her 
comments on a matter of public concern. The extent of publication, coupled 
with greater stress on the principle that public employees cannot 
reasonably expect unfettered freedom when it comes to First Amendment 
protection, will help employers establish clearer parameters in both the 
policy-making and discipline contexts. Whether these concepts will be 
adopted by future courts remains to be seen. Only recently has the Supreme 
Court begun to delve into the realities and structures of human 
communication and recognized that social media has become the “most 
important forum for exchanging ideas.”[158] “While we now may be 
coming to the realization that the Cyber Age is a revolution of historic 
proportions, we cannot yet appreciate its full dimensions and vast potential 
to alter how we think, express ourselves, and define who we want to be. The 
forces and directions of the Internet are so new, so protean, and so far 
reaching that courts must be conscious that what they say today might be 
obsolete tomorrow.”[159] As the case law and analysis on the topic of social 




media deepens and evolves, so too must the structure for analyzing prior 
restraints on speech. At some point, the courts will catch up with the 
realities of the workplace and social media. 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
By Student Editorial Board: 
Johnny D. Derogene, Patrick J. Foote, Miranda L. Huber, and Matt Soaper  
 
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee 
Relations Report.  It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the 
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on 
developments under the public employee collective bargaining statutes and 
the equal employment opportunity laws. 
I. IELRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Interference with Protected Activity 
In Bakul Davé and Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University 
Carbondale, 35 PERI ¶ 75 (IELRB 2018), the IELRB dismissed Mr. Dave’s 
unfair labor practice complaint where he alleged that the university violated 
Section 14(a)(1) of the IELRA by failing to process his grievance. Davé 
alleged that because the university did not respond to his email, it violated 
Section 14(a)(1) which states an employer cannot discourage employees 
from engaging in such activities or other concerted activities for the 
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 
Davé, a faculty member at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, an 
email to the Dean of the College of Science with the subject line “Grievance 
- workload assignment.” In the email, Davé requested an informal meeting 
about his grievance. No one responded to Davé’s request.  
The collective bargaining agreement that governed the faculty allowed 
individual faculty members to file grievances. The contract stated that “If 
the Board does not answer a grievance within the specified time limit or any 
agreed extension thereof, the grievance may be considered to be denied at 
the level and immediately moved to the next level.” The structure allowed 
for an informal meeting and if the grievance was not resolved, the faulty 
member could file a formal grievance. The ALJ found that was the 
responsibility of the faulty member to advance the grievance from the 
informal to the formal stage.  




The IELRB held Dave’s claim was insufficient. The contract stated that it 
was the claiming party’s responsibility to advance the claim to the next 
stage of grievance process if the board did not respond. Davé claimed that 
his email was the start of the informal process so he had not had a chance 
to advance the claim yet. The IELRB rejected this argument, stating the 
university’s lack of response was not a refusal to process his grievance. 
Therefore, the IELRB denied Dave’s claim.  
B. Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining 
In AFSCME. Council 31 and Western Illinois University, 35 PERI ¶ 60 
(IELRB 2018), the IELRB held that the university violated Sections 14(a)(5) 
and (1) of the IELRA when it unilaterally laid off 110 clerical employees 
without giving the union a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the 
effects of the layoffs. The IELRB applied the test from Central City 
Education Ass’n v. IERLB, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992), and held 
that the employer’s economically motivated decision to lay off the 
employees was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
Western Illinois University faced financial difficulties in 2016 because of 
declines in State appropriations and student enrollment. In an online news 
release, the university announced its decision to lay off clerical, non-
instructional, employees and the union demanded bargaining over the 
layoffs. Over roughly four months, from March 30, 2016 through July 28, 
2016, the union and the university met three times to negotiate and 
bargain. In their first meeting, the parties only discussed employees’ 
furlough days and wage increase. The union was not aware of the university’s 
decision to lay off the employees until after that first meeting. 
In their second meeting, the union made three proposals to the university 
in an attempt to minimize the layoffs’ effects on the bargaining unit 
members. First, the union proposed that if a position was vacated due to 
the layoff, and the laid off employee was still employed with the university, 
that employee would be given the option to return to the vacated position 
before the employer used its recall list. The university responded that it 
reserved its right to reassign staff as necessary. Second, the union proposed 
that employees who dropped in classification would be red-circled—they 
would maintain the pay rates they had prior to the layoffs. The university 
responded that it would not red-circle wages or rates. Third, the union 
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proposed that student workers would not perform bargaining unit work. 
The university responded that student workers simply worked in 
conjunction with employees; they did not displace or replace bargaining 
unit employees. The university contended that there were no proposals the 
unions representing its employees could have made that would have 
completely avoided its need to layoff the clerical employees. 
In holding that the university violated Sections 14(a)(5) and (1) of the 
IELRA, the IELRB found that the university did not give the union notice or 
a meaningful opportunity to bargain before it announced its decision to lay 
off the employees. The university argued that it reached impasse with the 
union when they first met on March 30, 2016, because the union did not 
offer any concessions. The IELRB reasoned that the university and the 
union could not have reached impasse because in that meeting, the union 
was unware that the university was considering laying off the employees. In 
that meeting, the parties only negotiated over the employees’ furlough days 
and wage increase.  
The university made at least six arguments to support its position that it did 
not violate the IELRA. First, the university argued that the layoffs were not 
a mandatory subject of bargaining. The IELRB applied the Central City test 
and held that the university’s economically motivated layoffs were a 
mandatory subject of bargaining because the layoffs concerned “wages, 
hours, and terms and conditions of employment.” The IELRB rejected the 
university’s position consistent with its prior decision and the Illinois 
Appellate Court’s decision that layoffs are “inextricably connected” with 
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment because laid off 
employees lose their wages, hours and terms and conditions of 
employment. Central City School District 133, 9 PERI ¶ 1051 (IELRB 1993); 
AFSCME v. ISLRB, 274 Ill.App.3d 327, 653 N.E.2d 1357 (1st Dist. 1995).  
Second, The IELRB rejected the university’s argument that it was not 
required to bargain over its decision to lay off the clerical employees 
because decisions to layoff are not a mandatory subject of bargaining under 
Section 4.5(b) of the IELRA. The IELRB agreed with the union that Section 
4.5(b) does not apply to the university. The IELRB found that, pursuant to 
Section 4.5(a), Section 4.5(b), would apply only if the university’s territorial 
boundaries were coterminous with those of a city with a population that 
exceeds 500,000; a City like Chicago. The IELRB decided that Section 




4.5(b) does not apply to employers that are not covered under Section 
4.5(a). 
Third, the IELRB rejected the university’s argument that it was not 
required to bargain over the layoffs because there were no concessions that 
the union could have made to avoid the layoffs. The IELRB found that 
whether a union offers concessions is not part of the Central City test. 
Accordingly, whether or not the union offered concessions did not mean 
that the layoffs were not a mandatory subject of bargaining.  
Fourth, the IELRB also rejected the university’s argument that it was 
excused from the duty to bargain because of its economic exigency. The 
IELRB reasoned that the university began facing financial difficulties in 
early 2016, but it waited until April 13, 2016, to notify the union of its 
decision to lay off the employees. The IELRB held that, since the 
university’s alleged economic exigency were caused by its own delay in 
notifying the union of its decision to layoff the employees, the university 
could not use the economic exigency defense. 
Fifth, the IELRB rejected the university’s argument that it did not violate 
Sections 14(a)(5) and (1) of the IELRA by failing to bargain the effects of the 
layoffs in good faith. The university argued that the union waived its right 
to bargain various matters when it agreed to incorporate the State 
University Civil Service System (SUCSS) rules in the collective bargaining 
agreement. The IELRB decided that, while the parties agreed in their CBA 
that the SUCSS’ rules governed layoffs, the university admitted that 
“benefits issues such as separation pay, insurance continuation, assistance 
with unemployment, and similar matters” were left to bargain. The IELRB 
held that, since the union made certain proposals concerning the effects of 
the layoffs, the university had a duty to bargain because the SUCSS rules 
did not preclude such bargaining.  
Lastly, the university argued that it engaged in good faith bargaining over 
the effects of the layoffs. However, the issue in contest was whether the 
university gave the union a meaningful opportunity to bargain over the 
effects of the layoffs before it implemented its decision to lay off the 
employees. The IELRB found that it did not. The IELRB decided that the 
bargaining session that occurred shortly before the university implemented 
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its layoff decision was insufficient to provide the union with a meaningful 
opportunity to bargain over the effects of the layoffs.  
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Duty to Bargain 
In Dept. of Central Mgmt. Svcs. v. ILRB., 2018 Ill. App. (4th) 160827 the 
Fourth District Appellate Court reversed the ILRB State Panel where the 
ILRB deviated from its usual five-factor impasse test to use the “single 
critical issue” impasse test without explanation. The Department of Central 
Management Services (“CMS”) and AFSCME Council 31 were negotiating 
their 2015-2019 collective bargaining agreement. 
Negotiations were challenging from the start because the State had billions 
of dollars in unpaid bills. AFSCME was the first to present any substantive 
proposal, intended as a broad set of policies; its proposal sought to ensure 
the State did not work to diminish employees’ rights on the job.  In 
response, the State submitted its first set of noneconomic issues; its 
proposals aimed to change several of the bargaining unit’s contractual 
rights for “efficiency and flexibility” in the State’s work and reducing 
operating costs.  The court noted that these initial proposals, along with 
AFSCME’s concern that Governor Rauner wanted to break the union, “set 
the tone” for the negotiation process. The ALJ held a 25-day hearing and 
subsequently issued a 250-page recommended decision that covered the 
impasse issues, along with some unfair labor practice allegations. In it, she 
recommended that CMS implement some aspects of its last, best, and final 
offer and return to bargaining on other issues.  The ILRB adopted the ALJ’s 
ruling in part, but rejected the ALJ’s impasse analysis, implementing a 
different impasse test. 
CMS and AFSCME had agreed on some issues, such as a grievance 
procedure package.  However, the parties still did not agree on key issues.  
In a negotiation meeting, CMS declared that they were at an impasse and 
gave AFSCME its last, best, and final offer. AFSCME disagreed; while CMS 
wanted to go to the ILRB over whether the parties were at impasse, 
AFSCME thought this was unnecessary because it believed that they had 
not yet reached an impasse. After the 25-day hearing, the ALJ found that 
the parties had reached impasse on some, but not all, issues, including 
wages, health insurance, vacation, mandatory overtime, a management 




rights clause, and subcontracting.  When this case came before the State 
Panel, it held that subcontracting was a single, critical issue that lead to a 
break in the entire bargaining process and that CMS thus permissibly 
presented its last, best, and final offer. 
On appeal, AFSCME argued that the ILRB erred by using the “single critical 
issue” impasse test without explaining why it no longer used the five-factor 
test from a prior decision, known as the Taft factors, for the NLRB’s 
decision in Taft Broadcasting Co., 163 N.L.R.B. 465 (1967). Those factors 
account for: 1) the parties’ bargaining history; 2) whether they negotiated in 
good faith; 3) how long negotiations have gone on; 4) the importance of the 
issues on which the parties cannot agree; and 5) what the parties 
understood about the state of negotiations while they were ongoing. The 
appellate court agreed with AFSCME, noting that the National Labor 
Relations Board used the Taft factors in most cases; indeed, the court noted 
that even when the NLRB used a “single critical issue” analysis, it was 
guided by the above-listed factors.  
Further, the court noted that the ILRB was free to change course if it was 
appropriate to do so, but that there must be an explanation.  Such a burden 
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s admonition that “an agency must 
cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.”  
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the U.S. v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48 (1983). The ILRB, according to the 
court, failed to do this; it simply undertook a single critical factor analysis 
and merely stated in a footnote that it was unnecessary to apply the five-
factor test at all. This unexplained shift was critical because, as the ALJ 
noted in her recommendation, the Taft factors would bring about a 
different result. Specifically, the record plainly showed that AFSCME did 
not understand the parties to be at an impasse. Considering that difference 
in understandings between the parties would seriously undermine the 
notion that the parties were at an impasse in negotiations, thereby making 
it more difficult to find in favor of CMS. As such, the Fourth District 
Appellate Court remanded back to the ILRB for an explanation or for 
application of the five-factor impasse analysis. 
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B. Retaliation for Protected Conduct 
In Travis Koester and County of Sangamon and Sheriff of Sangamon 
County, Case No. S-CA-16-133 (ILRB State Panel 2018), the State Panel 
rejected an Administrative Law Judge’s recommendation that respondents 
violated Sections 10(a)(1) of the Act when they removed the charging party 
from its Tactical Response Unit (TRU) in retaliation for engaging in 
protected activity.  
The charging party alleged that he was dismissed for filing two grievances, 
one in 2014 and one in 2016, challenging the promotion of three 
individuals. He claimed that he was entitled to promotion over those who 
received them according to Sangamon County Merit Rules and Regulations. 
Neither grievance was advanced by the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police, 
the charging party’s exclusive bargaining representative.  
After the filing of the 2016 grievance, TRU members Darric Miller and 
Travis Dalby approached Lieutenant John Hayes, commander of TRU, to 
voice their concerns about the charging party. A subsequent meeting 
revealed that several team members were concerned about impact of the 
charging party’s grievances and FOIA requests on TRU members’ morale. 
Hayes directed Miller to draft a memo of their concerns. Hayes then wrote 
and submitted his own memo to Captain Cheryllynn Williams who oversaw 
TRU. Hayes’ memo did not mention the grievances or specific events 
leading to the loss of trust but recommended the removal of the charging 
party to “maintain the effectiveness and efficiency” of TRU. 
The ALJ found that the charging party had established a prima facie case 
for retaliation in violation of Section 10(a)(1). To establish a prima facie 
case for retaliation, a charging party must show that: (1) the charging party 
engaged in protected activity (the filing of the grievances), (2) the 
respondent was aware of that activity (the Miller memo, which Hayes read, 
mentioned the grievances), and (3) that the respondent took adverse action 
because of that activity (removal from TRU constituted an adverse action 
because it affected his ability to earn overtime, among other things). The 
ALJ further concluded that the respondents’ business reasons for removing 
Charging Party were pretextual. 
After a review of the respondents’ exceptions, the State Panel held that the 
charging party failed to establish that his filing of the 2014 and 2016 




grievances were a substantial or motivating factor in respondents’ decision 
to remove him from TRU. The ILRB further held that the reason for the 
removal from TRU was charging party’s fellow TRU members’ lack of trust 
in him. It was not that the TRU members were upset because the charging 
party filed grievances; they simply took issue with the subject of those 
grievances. They felt that the subject of the grievances showed that the 
charging party would look out for himself at the expense of his comrades; 
something they felt was antithetical to the ethos of TRU. 
Furthermore, the ALJ found that Lieutenant Hayes had an improper 
motivation because he failed to conduct an investigation and bring his 
recommendation for removal to the whole team before submitting it up the 
chain of command. The State Panel held that, absent evidence that Hayes 
regularly sought agreement from the whole unit when deciding to remove 
members, Hayes’ failure to do so in this instance did not indicate an 
improper motive. The State Panel dismissed the complaint. 
III. EEO DEVELOPMENTS 
A. Age Discrimination 
In Mount Lemmon Fire District v. Guido, 139 S. Ct. 22 (2018), the Supreme 
Court held that a unit of local government is subject to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act regardless of the number of employees 
it has.  The ADEA defines “employer” to mean, “a person engaged in an 
industry affecting commerce who has twenty or more employees . . . . The 
term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political 
subdivision of a State. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 630.  The Court reasoned that the 
requirement of having at least 20 employees for coverage applied only to :a 
person engaged in commerce.”  The following sentence, that “employer” 
also means “a State or political subdivision of a State” is an addition to 
persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has at least 0 
employees.  Accordingly, the Court concluded, the numerosity requirement 
for coverage of persons engaged in industries affecting commerce does not 
apply to political subdivisions of states.  The decision was unanimous 
except of Justice Kavanaugh who did not participate in consideration of the 
case. 
 
